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Robert W. Jenson 
CHRISTIAN INITIATION: ETHICS AND ESCHATOLOGY 
I did not choose the three terms of my assignment: "initiation", 
"ethics" and "eschatology." It would take a degree of arrogance 
that I do not have, to select the universe for one's subject in 
this fashion. While I did not choose them, I am fortunate in your 
committee having chosen them. For in fact, as it turns out, the 
three terms nestle beautifully together and define a field of re-
flection that I have found enjoyable. Baptism is initiation into 
the Christian church, an ethical community. And baptism is initia-
tion into the kingdom of God, the eschatological community. And it 
does both these things at once, thereby setting up a dialectic. 
What more could any systematic theologian ask for? That baptism 
does doubly initiate, is, I take it, dogma. It could be argued; 
but on this occasion I will assume it, and go on. 
If one event can thus initiate into two communities --the church and 
the kingdom of God-- then those two must somehow be mutually deter-
mined. The matter of the mutual determination of the church and the 
kingdom is a large part of the matter of Christian ethics and escha-
tology--which is what I mean about the size of the assignment. For-
tunately, I can for present purposes finesse some of these heavy 
matters by noting that the two communities must in any case of their 
material relationship be related; that is, by noting a purely formal 
mutual determination which must obtain. The eschatological community 
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must itself be an ethical community; and the ethical community of 
the church must itself be eschatologically determined. And this 
purely formal determination will--as I hope you will come to agree--
be quite enough for me to be going on with. 
The kingdom must be an ethical community. That is, the kingdom will 
not be a mere collection of blissful human monads, but a polity, a 
group linked and mutually animated by crisscrossing relations of 
freedom and love. It is not even logically possible that the kingdom 
of God should have a population of one. That, to be sure, is not how 
we usually think of the matter. As I think of heaven, I of course 
expect to see all of you there, and my grandparents, and my Sunday 
school teachers, and all; but if I should turn out to be there alone, 
I will still be satisfied with the situation. The mere fact that it 
is so, shows that I have not conceived the kingdom of God as an ethical 
community, that is to say, as an actual community: a group that is 
not a mere collection but mutually determined by love and freedom. 
Now the other side of the relation. The ethical community of the 
church is eschatologically determined. That is, the moral life of 
the church is determined by the fact of the eschaton, by the fact of 
the coming kingdom; and the moral life of the church therefore is 
always in at least potential radical discontinuity with the moral life 
of other communities around it, that make up the human world. I want 
to spend a little more time with this. 
It is the reality and the import of this discontinuity between the 
moral life of the church and that of the world around it, that the 
Reformation doctrine of justification states. In the Reformation 
doctrine of justification, the gospel, the proclamation of the res-
urrection of the crucified Jesus, is in its actual doing, in its 
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character as viva vox, understood as nothing less than the last 
judgment let out ahead of time. The Reformation doctrine of justi-
fication is instruction to would-be speakers of the gospel: speak 
the gospel as Zast judgment, as a judgment on the entire worth of 
hearers' lives. 
The gospel is a last word. It comes after all is said and done; it 
is spoken when it is too late for bargaining, and too late for prom-
ises to do better, and too late for worries about relapse, it is an 
unaonditionaZ declaration of the value of the hearers' lives. The 
Reformation doctrine of justification is instructions to would-be 
preachers to talk about their hearers' lives and Jesus Christ's 
resurrection so that their talking works this way. Moreover, the 
last judgment spoken ahead of time is not merely unconditional news, 
unconditional judgment of the worth of the hearers' lives, but un-
conditionally good news, unconditionally affirmative judgment on 
hearers' lives. The gospel is good news just because it is spoken 
ahead of time; for since God thus does not wait for us to be finished 
with our lives to judge them, his judgment can rest only in his own 
will, which, since he is the Father of Jesus, is a good will. 
It is in this proleptic character of the gospel that its ethical 
relevance lies. Since we hear the last judgment on our lives before 
we finish our lives, we have our lives in this world to finish after 
this hearing. Thus the peculiar character of the moral life of the 
believing community is that it is the common life of those who are 
past having anything to lose or gain, the common life of those for 
whom ulterior motivations and mitigating considerations, while doubt-
less present and influential, are nevertheless morally and ethically 
irrelevant, the common life of those for whom it is too late for 
virtue to have any reward but itself. If virtue is not its own only 
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reward, then we are of all men most miserable, because it is too 
late for us to receive any other. As the Augsburg Confession puts 
it in Article VI: "It is taught among us that one must do good 
works of all sorts as God commands them for his sake." Period. 
The Christian church is the polity within which the question, "But 
why should I do good?" can only have the answer, "If you have to 
ask, don't bother." Louis Armstrong is said to have responded to 
someone who asked him, "What is jazz?" by saying, "If you gotta ask, 
you ain't got it." And to the question, "But why not do evil, that 
good may come of it, that grace may abound?", Paul had no more sat-
isfactory answer. He only could say, "Well, if you still ask that 
question, we'll start all over again. Let me explain baptism." If 
you gotta ask "Why do good in the Christian church?", then do evil, 
for God's sake! The Christian church is the polity within which 
morality and ethical reflection and discourse have this eschatological 
determination, in which they come after the last judgment. 
There are two aspects of this eschatological morality that I want to 
single out. First, the ethics that operate within the Christian 
church are freed from the necessity of agreement with the ethics of 
other communities to which believers will also belong. The Christian 
church is cut off from the ways of the world by the end of the world 
which has happened to it already. 
To be sure, since the kingdom of God will be the fulfillment of all 
history and not just that of the church, the good of the kingdom and 
the good of all human communities are the same. The love that faith 
makes possible in the believing community, God makes possible in 
other ways elsewhere. The love that faith makes possible in the 
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believing community and the love recommended by the golden rule in 
all its world-wide versions are one and the same. 
But it does not follow from this that the world always seeks its 
own good. The kingdom of God is the good of the world; but it does 
not follow that the world seeks the kingdom. And more to our point, 
it does not even follow that the world knows its own good. It is 
quite possible for the world's ethics and not merely its action to 
be perverse. It is quite possible for a community positively to 
commend as good, what is in fact evil and will destroy the community. 
Therefore, the believing community must expect that sometimes what 
it feels and knows about the good, and what the world and surround-
ing communities feel and know about the good, will agree. And some-
times the believing community must expect that they will not agree. 
The church is eschatologically free to live equally well with either 
situation. Indeed the church is even free to manipulate these pos-
sibilities to the purposes of its mission. When the church is seeking 
to penetrate a culture, as in the great days of the 4th century in 
the West, it may legitimately and properly emphasize the continuity 
of its vision of good with that of the culture. But when the church 
is seeking freedom from a dying or manifestly perverse world, or 
must live in a ghetto built for it by the culture in which it lives, 
then the church is free actively to train its members in prophetic 
dissent and underground subversion. 
Second, the believing community is an ethical community in which the 
difference between rights and duties does not apply. The whole ethic 
of modern America and the most of the modern West is built around 
that difference. I am concerned about my rights; and you are 
concerned about my duties. And I am concerned about your duties; 
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and you are concerned about your rights. The Constitution, that 
whole fantastic apparatus, exists for the sole purpose of keeping 
these two laboriously sorted out: my rights are what you must do 
for me; my duties are what I must do for you. But in the church, 
the questions, "Well, what do I have to do?" and, "Well, what do 
you have to do for me?" have no answers at all. The answer to both 
is always, "Well, if you gotta ask, nothing." 
This does not mean, by the way, what we are at this period in the 
history of the American church strongly tempted to make it mean. 
It does not mean that the church is the community with only rights: 
the universal and supreme liberation movement, the community that 
has found rights for everybody, as many rights as you need. The 
church is not the community in which there are only rights and no 
duties; the church is the community in which there are neither. The 
Reformation doctrine of justification--which is what we are talking 
about this whole time--did not say that the gospel frees us to ig-
nore the law. It said that the gospel frees us from that final core 
of egocentric defiance that expresses itself in the questions, "What 
do I gotta do?" and "What do you gotta do for me?" Just so the 
gospel frees us to love the law. 
The gospel frees us to a natural coincidence of God's will and ours. 
We who have no rights or duties, for whom there are no answers to 
"gotta" questions, who must live our lives with each other after 
hearing the last judgment are in this respect perfect like our 
heavenly Father. We have nothing to win or lose. Our will is in-
trinsically in the same situation as his. The point about the 
church as an ethical community is not its willingness to accept just 
everything. The point about the church is rather its freedom to 
devote itself single-mindedly to justice and mutual responsibility. 
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So far a very brief discussion of the way in which the kingdom of God, 
the eschatological community, is ethical, and in which the church, 
an ethical community, is eschatological. All that was to establish 
the scope of my main argument, which I may now begin. 
It will not, I think, need to be much argued that throughout modern 
history the mutual determination the church's ethical community and 
the kingdom's eschatological community has become increasingly hard 
to realize. On t.he one side, we are for the most part unable to 
await the kingdom as an actual, that is ethically constituted, com-
munity. When is the last time any of you preached or heard a sermon 
in which the Kingdom was described, proclaimed in advance in its 
communal and moral content? Old-time religionists among us strive 
one by one to enter bliss; and if only one of them makes it, he will 
be happy. And the rest of us make do with sundry existential or 
liberated or processed metaphysical adumbrations of salvation, whose 
even more paltry individualism is only obscured by sophisticated 
equivocation. 
On the other side, the side of the church, the Western church has 
sat about for centuries observing the collapse of its Constantinian 
penetration of Western civilization. An entire generation of theo-
logians was schooled in the principle that all you had to do was 
say, "The Constantinian settlement has collapsed," and your career 
was launched. But even as we have said such things, we have only 
become more slavish in our obedience to the Constantinian settlement. 
Even as the life of the Western world has become ever more nihilist, 
ever more empty, ever more flagrantly incoherent with the will of 
God, and even as the church's need for prophetic freedom from the 
world has therefore become ever more urgent, we have in fact become 
ever more addicted to baptizing every wind of the world's ethical 
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doctrine. Whatever the with-it group in our locality says is good 
this week, we suddenly discover to be the real meaning of the gospel. 
Churchly social service agencies are big abortion pushers. The woods 
are full of "pastoral counselors" who establish their claim to ex-
pertise in marital counseling by pointing to how well they survived 
their own divorces. And nobody laughs. 
The mutual determination of the church's ethical community and the 
eschatological community of the kingdom is that on the one hand the 
kingdom is to be awaited as a real community, a net of moral relations 
between actual people, and that on the other hand the moral life and 
ethical discourse of the Christian church are eschatologically deter-
mined. This mutual determination has through the whole modern period 
of the church's life become more difficult to realize. 
At least at the conceptual level, the cause of the difficulty is re-
latively well known. In the thought, and more important, in the 
piaty and sacramental practice of the late antique and medieval 
church, the kingdom of God and the community of the church were able 
to be seen and understood together by a specific adaptation of an-
tique metaphysics. This ran very roughly as follows. God, of 
course, knows in advance what the kingdom will be like--which seems 
reasonable and comes out of the Bible, more or less. By antique 
metaphysical doctrine, this divine knowledge, the content of the 
mind of GcJ, is interpreted as a substantial reality, as, indeed, the 
realist sort of reality. This reality is then the timeless foun~Rtion, 
the eternal ground of all the temporal reality we live in. Thus the 
timeless reality of the mind of God is reflected by and in all tem-
poral realities. The one particular temporal reality, the church, 
can be understood as very straightforwardly and unproblematically 
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built on the kingdom, as eternally real in the mind of God. And as 
built on the kingdom in the mind of God it reflects the kingdom. 
Intellectually and in practice the history of the modern world has 
been mostly devoted to dismantling this cla~sical Christian meta-
physics. Nobody lives his life anymore, though he may have studied 
Tillich, on the ground of the eternal contents of the mind of God. 
At the very beginning of the history of dismantling is the Lutheran 
Reformation 1 s insistence that the continuity between the church and 
the kingdom., their mutual determination, must be understood ahristo-
ZogiaaZZy. It is not established in eternity, but in the temporal 
event of the life, death, and resurrection of the Christ. Obviously, 
I will agree with that; but it leaves a lot still unsettled. And much 
of the history of Protestantism has been a search for specific chris-
tological continuities between the church and the kingdom of God. 
Most of Protestantism has been a search for immanent continuities be-
tween the church and the kingdom of God. Properly so-called liber-
alism posited historiaaZ continuities between the church and the 
kingdom of God, which ran more or less as follows. There was once an 
extremely important religious and ethical historical personage, Jesus 
of Nazareth. His influence continues in history, and operates by 
way of his followers, the church. The impact of this continuing in-
fluence of Jesus in history is that human communities get better and 
better. The kingdom of God is the end of the process, which may be 
conceived of as an actual end or as the limit of an infinite series. 
But these days we are more likely to depend upon psyahoZogiaaZ con-
tinuities. The kingdom will be defined in terms, for example, of 
"wholeness": the kingdom is where everybody is whole. The Church 
is understood as the place where it is known that thinking about 
Jesus is good for your mental health, that it promotes wholeness. 
And there again, there is supposed to be a mutual determination of 
the ethical life of the church and the kingdom of God. 
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For some time this whole Protestant enterprise has been not so much 
refuted as made to seem paltry, by the terrors of the 20th century 
and by the rediscovered grandeur of Biblical eschatology. Our cen-
tury has one great attempt at something adequately radical to the task 
of seeing the church and the kingdom of God in their mutual determi-
nation, and that is the theology of Karl Barth. Luther had said: 
The Church and the Kingdom of God determine each other in Christ. 
Barth simply asked: Well, what is so sacred about our inherited 
conceptions of time, that we should not just take Luther literally? 
Why shouldn't we say that Jesus Christ, himself, the historical per-
sonage and sequence of events by that name, is in God the eternal 
ground of all things? What Greek metaphysics and, following them, 
the classical Christian theology sought in the content of the mind 
of God, in fact exists; but it is not the content of anybody's mere 
mind, it is an historical event named Jesus. Everything that happens 
is at its root a mere reflection of events and circumstances of the 
life of Christ. 
Well now, of course, when students ask me about Barth and I try to 
explain this, they look at me puzzled and say, "But Jenson, you say 
that everything that happens is a reflection and a working out of 
Christ; how about what happened before Christ?" The answer to that 
is that it was Barth's radical intuition that there is no "before 
Christ," that this historical event is constitutive in the eternal 
God. It is the life of God that is lived in Palestine; and therefore, 
all creation and all that happens in creation happen inside what 
happened in Palestine; neither before nor after it, but internally 
to it. 
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It is this one vision that is refracted through all the volumes of 
the Churah Dogmatias. Doubtless, in its own simplicity, it is true, 
marking an achievement behind which we may not regress. Yet by itself 
and as developed in Barth's systematics, neither will it quite do. 
There is a reason why everybody is impressed by Barth--if they ever 
read him--and then having read him don't believe him. For the posture 
Barth leaves us in is too much that of the disciples who were rebuked 
at the ascension for gazing off into a distance in which Christ has 
disappeared. "Jesus Christ, himself, is the eternal foundation of all 
reality," can mean that the eternal foundation comes down to dwell 
among us; but ~t can mean also that Jesus Christ flies off into Cal-
vinist heaven. And it is the latter that seems to have triumphed in 
the full systematics of Barth. 
So, where is the christological unity of the kingdom and the church? 
How is it that one baptism can initiate into both simultaneously? 
Where does it happen that the ethical life of the church comes to be 
a life lived after the last judgment, as the Lutheran doctrine of jus-
tification says? And where does it happen that the kingdom of God, 
the end of all things, acquires the character of a real human com-
munity in all its ethical complexities? Where is the christological 
unity of kingdom and church, of the eschatological and ethical com-
munities? You will guess where I am heading: back to the title 
your committee gave me. 
Through most of the history of Western Christianity we have presup-
posed that baptism can simultaneously initiate into the church and 
into the kingdom because those two are tied together some place and 
some way else. We have supposed that it is because the church and 
the kingdom are one in the metaphysical structure of things that 
baptism can initiate into both. Or we have supposed that it is 
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because in the church those historical influences of Jesus' good 
teaching, which will finally lead to the kingdom, are at work, that 
baptism can initiate into the church and the kingdom. Or we have 
supposed it is because in the church there is extra good counseling, 
which will no doubt finally provoke the kingdom of God, that baptism 
can initiate into both the church and the kingdom. Or ... 
The truth, I suspect, is much simpler. Baptism can initiate into 
both the church and the kingdom of God because baptism is what joins 
them in the first place. Baptism is itself God's act to create a 
human community that is eschatologically determined; and baptism is 
itself God's act to create a kingdom of God that will be a real 
human community. Baptism is, itself, as this worldly event, the 
christological act of God that identifies the ethical community of 
the church and the eschatological community of the kingdom. 
Nor do I mean that what does this is a hidden act of God: as though 
there were the baptizer pouring water and saying words--all this 
visible and audible--and then inside it, underneath it, above it, 
God were at work. It is the unity of the church and the kingdom 
that is hidden. Baptism is the visible work of God that achieves 
the hidden work. In old fashioned sacramental terminology, the res 
of this sacrament, the holy reality, is precisely joint membership 
in a human community and the kingdom of God, is precisely that the 
church and the kingdom are mutually determinative. And what achieves 
this, what brings it to pass, is the visible, audible, feelable 
event: in old fashioned terminology, the signum, the sign. The 
rite itself is God's act to establish the ethical reality of his 
kingdom at the last and the eschatological reality of his church 
in the present. 
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Thus to the explanation of our now nearly millenial difficulty in 
realizing the unity of church and kingdom: While we have ransacked 
nature and supernature, metaphysics and physics, history and super-
history, looking for the place where the kingdom of God and our 
lives in the church touch and mutually determine each other, we have 
been busily at work dismantling precisely those aspects of baptism 
that actually bring the kingdom and the church together. 
Let me take the two sides again. Why are we unable to anticipate 
the kingdom as a real, that is to say, ethically-filled human com-
munity? Why do we always finally think of it, despite the fact that 
we mock such conceptions, as me by myself floating on my cloud enjoy-
ing God? I suggest it is because the great act on which we rely for 
our entry into the kingdom, baptism, in fact displays no ethical, no 
communal, no human consequences. It is performed on us, and we are 
relieved that we are now o.k. for the eschaton. We perform it and 
see it performed on our children and are relieved that now they too 
are o.k. for the eschaton. And both occur without any ethical or 
communal consequences whatever observedly taking place. What makes 
us o.k. for the kingdom does not in fact grant the privileges and the 
sustenance of the believing community. Sunday after Sunday after 
Sunday we see infants baptized and we know that their life in the 
Christian community will be no whit different the next day than it 
was the day before. And since this is what admits us to the kingdom, 
we do not and cannot conceive the kingdom as an ethical community. 
That is to say, we baptize and having baptized we do not commune, do 
not in fact admit to the Christian community. We do not, indeed, do 
anything with respect to the Christian community by baptism. Baptism 
is therefore a communally empty sacrament; and that is why when we 
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think of it as our ticket into the kingdom we think of the kingdom 
as noncommunal. 
Moreover, we are baptized and we baptize with no hint that momentous 
ethiaaZ burdens are thereby imposed. The baptized person is not ex-
pected to behave differently after baptism than before. For the most 
part that is even true of the way we do adult baptism, to say nothing 
of infant baptism where the infant aannot behave differently after 
than before. And since baptism is our initiation into the kingdom of 
God, there is no hint that membership in the kingdom of God is an 
ethical matter--that the kingdom will be a place where people love 
each other. 
We are unable to anticipate the kingdom as an actual ethical community; 
and no quantity of verbal preaching and verbal instruction will alter 
that one whit so long as we baptize without granting community, and 
without anyone undergoing ethical catechesis in the process. It is 
like the Supper. We all now have learned to preach that there is the 
great messianic banquet coming one day. But then every so often we 
give a sample of the cuisine--for that is what we tell the people the 
Supper is, a foretaste of the messianic banquet. And this foretaste 
of the messianic cooking turns out to be a thimbleful of port and a 
bit of squashed down Wonderbread. Then we wonder why folk are not 
slavering for the messianic banquet--i.e., for an eternity of bad 
port and fish food. Well, one must agree with Shaw. 
On the other side, we are unable to apprehend the moral life of the 
church in its freedom from the world's moral life and in its ability 
to dedicate itself out of sheer love to the will of God. The lack of 
ethical catechesis is of course relevant also here. We admit people 
to the church without teaching either them or their parents that they 
72 
have to live differently than they used to because this is being done. 
But I suspect that the difficulty is mostly that we enter the church 
by an act which manifestly is not a departure from or a renunciation 
of anything at all, which sheerly lacks the mere drama to be a plausible 
rite of passage from one life to the other. So long as what happens 
among us, by which in actual experience our communities are constituted, 
is that only little babies, surrounded by cooing heathen who can't 
find the creed in the service books, are moistened slightly on their 
foreheads, nobody can believe that those entering the church die to 
one life and are born into another one. I don't believe it; you don't 
believe it; nobody believes it. We say we do, but it is not possible, 
so long as this is how the church-community is in fact constituted 
before our eyes. 
We need not repristinate the particular drama of patristic baptism. 
We may not be able to repristinate the exorcisms. We may not be able 
to repristinate the great cry facing the West: "Satan, I renounce 
you." We may not be able to repristinate the simultaneously shaming 
and exhilarating nakedness of the bath. But if we cannot repristinate 
these things, then something must replace them. And until something 
does replace them, no amount of catechetical instruction, no amount of 
preaching, no amount of Sunday School, no amount of verbalizing will 
persuade anybody that the church is different from the Rotary Club, 
because they see it demonstrated before their eyes that it is not 
different from the Rotary Club, that the way you enter the church is, 
if anything, slightly less rigorous than the way you enter Rotary. 
Harking back to the doctrine of justification, which is what has been 
spooking around here the whole time, I conclude: It is the reality 
of the Reformation doctrine of justification that is at stake in the 
liturgy of baptism. 
